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which firms commit at the ex-ante stage to truthfully share information. We show that if 
signals are i.i.d., then pairwise stable networks of sharing agreements are either empty or 
made of fully connected components of increasing size. When linking is costly, non 
complete components may emerge, and components with larger size are less densly 
connected than components with smaller size. When signals have different variances, 
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acting as "critical nodes". Finally, when signals are correlated, the empty network may not 
be pairwise stable when the number of firms and/or correlation are large enough. 
 
Keywords  
Information sharing, oligopoly, networks, Bayesian equilibrium 
 
JEL Codes 




Address for correspondence: 
Sergio Currarini 
Department of Economics 
Ca’ Foscari University of Venice 
Cannaregio 873, Fondamenta S.Giobbe 
30121 Venezia - Italy 
Phone: (++39) 041 2349133 
Fax: (++39) 041 2349176 
e-mail: s.currarini@unive.it 
This Working Paper  is published under the auspices of the Department of Economics of the Ca’ Foscari University of Venice. Opinions 
expressed herein are those of the authors and not those of the Department. The Working Paper series is designed to divulge preliminary or 
incomplete work, circulated to favour discussion and comments. Citation of this paper should consider its provisional character. 
 
 1 Introduction
The incentives of oligopolistic ﬁrms to share private information about a random demand
intercept have been studied by vast literature, pioneered by the works of Novshek and Son 
nenschein (1982), Clarke (1983), Vives (1985), Li (1985) and Gal or (1985). All works in this
literature has modeled the transmission of information by assuming that ﬁrms disclose their
private information to a central agency (e.g., a Trade Association), which aggregates all the
received information and delivers it back to ﬁrms. While in most papers it is assumed that
ﬁrms receive the aggregated information independently of their disclosure decision, some au 
thors have studied a quid pro quo exchange mechanism, in which ﬁrms receive the aggregated
information if and only if they have disclosed their own (see Clark (1983), Kirby (1988),
Raith (1996)).
In the case of quid pro quo exchange, most results have compared ﬁrms’ expected proﬁts
in a scenario of complete absence of information with proﬁts in a scenario in which all ﬁrms
share their own information. Kirby (1988) has studied the Nash Equilibrium of a game in
which each ﬁrm decides its disclosure behaviour in a quid pro quo exchange,game.
In this paper we contribute to this literature by exploring the equilibrium sharing be 
haviour of ﬁrms when contracts are bilateral. In our model, ﬁrms meet in pairs, and decide
whether to share their own private information by means of an quid pro quo contract. What
we have in mind is therefore not a central device of information transmission, such as a
Trade Association, but rather a series of private and bilateral contacts, by which ﬁrms share
information in a targeted way, without necessarily disclosing it to all ﬁrms in the system.
The structure of bilateral sharing agreement is well represented by a non directed network,
in which nodes represent ﬁrms, and links represent agreements.
In this new context we address old and new questions in a simple Cournot game with
homogeneous goods and no production costs. Do we observe information sharing in equi 
librium? Can we characterize the equilibrium architectures agreements? Can we trace the
sharing behaviour of ﬁrms to their position in the network and vice versa? And what is the
role of asymmetry and correlation of private signals in determining equilibrium networks?
We employ the model of Gal Or (1985), in which a set of Cournot oligopolists each
observes a piece of the demand intercept. In this framework, the signals observed by ﬁrms
can be independently distributed, thus allowing for a benchmark model in which the model
remains tractable. For the case of i.i.d signals, we are able to fully characterize the set
2pairwise stable sharing networks.1 In this simple case, the incentives of two ﬁrms to share
information turn out to only depend on their relative degrees in the network (that is, on
the number of ﬁrms that observe their signals). In particular, the incentive of ﬁrm i to
share information with ﬁrm j increase with the degree of i and decrease with the degree of j.
Information sharing presents here clear aspects of congestion, with signals observed by many
ﬁrms having less informational value than signals viewed by few. One way of explaining
this result is the following. Expected proﬁts are strictly related to the variability of ﬁrms
equilibrium strategies in the Cournot game. The acquisition of new information has the eﬀect
of adding one source of variability (the new observed signal) and to reduce the variability
of the signals already observed (by sharing it with another ﬁrm). The variability added by
the acquisition of the new signal decreases with the number of ﬁrms observing that signal
(because of the larger correlation of ﬁrms’ equilibrium strategies), while the loss in variability
due to the disclosure of one’s own signal decreases with the number of ﬁrms that already
observe that signal.
This simple structure of incentives originate a large set of pairwise stable networks with,
nonetheless, neat qualitative features. First, the empty network (with no information shar 
ing) is always stable, a result that echoes previous literature. Indeed, two isolated ﬁrms
have no incentives to share information, just like two duopolist in the traditional approach.
Second, there exist many other pairwise stable networks in which positive information is
shared, all made of completely connected components with strictly increasing size. Firms are
therefore organized in ”Information Sharing Groups”, each informationally equivalent to a
centralized transmission device. For this benchmark model, we also look at the eﬀect of an
exogenous linking cost. Somewhat surprisingly, a small cost lead to qualitative diﬀerences
in the incentives to share and in equilibrium information structures. In particular, non com 
plete components are now possible as part of a stable network. Moreover, the ”density” of a
component (measure as the ratio between its average degree and its size) decreases with its
size. In other words, small groups of ﬁrms share information more tightly that large groups.
We then study extensions of this benchmark model. We ﬁrst allow independent signals
to have heterogeneous variances. The incentives to form a link depend now on the relative
degrees of ﬁrms and on the relative variance of their private signals. In general, the incentive
1The well known concept of pairwise stability, ﬁrst used in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996)), requires that
no link is either added or severed from the network. Adding a link requires mutual consent, while severing
requires the conent of one ﬁrm only.
3of ﬁrm i to form a link with ﬁrm j are decreasing in the variance of the signal observed
by i, and increasing in the variance of j’s signal. Intuitively, a large variance signal has a
large informational value, since it allows equilibrium strategies to acquire more variability.
Although the empty network remains an equilibrium, new and informationally incomplete
architecture are now possible. In particular, we show that non regular networks, usually
referred to as ”core periphery”, are stable, in which high variance ﬁrms have high degree and
act as ”connectors”, indirectly linking low variance ﬁrms.
We ﬁnally turn to the richer and more complex case of correlated signals. We ﬁrst show
that the empty network is not be pairwise stable for high enough levels of correlation. In
such cases, some positive amount of information sharing is present in all pairwise stable
networks   a result to be contrasted with the traditional view that information sharing is
incompatible with equilibrium in Cournot games with homogeneous goods. Intuitively, the
additional incentives of two ﬁrms to share information come from the improved inference
over the signals observed by the remaining ﬁrms; this better inference comes without any
additional disclosure of information to the remaining ﬁrms and is, in this sense, at no cost.
After showing that the complete network is always stable, we fully work out the case of four
ﬁrms, for which we characterize the set of stable network for diﬀerent ranges of the correlation
parameter. It is of some interest to analyze the eﬀect of correlation on the incentives to share.
In particular, as correlation grows we pass from a stable structure in which one isolated ﬁrm
refuses to join the information sharing group formed by the other ﬁrms, to one in which the
same ﬁrm is excluded from the group. Intuitively, for low levels of correlation, the isolated
ﬁrm ﬁnds it proﬁtable to exploit the full variance of its own signal; as correlation increases,
the proﬁtability for the isolated ﬁrm of observing another signal increases, simply because
of the increased inference power of such signal. However, the high level of correlation allows
the sharing group to have a good enough inference on the isolated ﬁrm, which is therefore
excluded.
We start by presenting the basic model, the information sharing mechanism and the
Cournot game played by ﬁrms. In section 3 we study the set of pairwise stable networks
when signals are independently distributed. Section 4 studies the case of correlated signals.
Section 5 concludes the paper.
42 The Model
2.1 Set-up
We consider a n ﬁrms oligopolistic market with linear demand and no costs. The size of the
market, given by the intercept of the demand function, is the sum of n random variables
(a1,a2,...,an) plus a deterministic part A:




qi is the aggregate produced level in the market, and where a ≡ a1+a2+...+an.
Each variable ai is private information of ﬁrm i.
The vector of random variables (a1,a2,...,an) is jointly normally distributed with zero
mean and matrix of variances and covariances:
  =
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Before observing the realization of private signals, ﬁrms can engage in bilateral information
sharing agreements. By signing such an agreement, ﬁrms i and j commit to truthfully
exchange the private information they receive, so that ﬁrm i gets to observe the realization
of the random variable aj and viceversa.
Bilateral agreements need not be transitive: the agreements ij and jk need not imply the
existence of an agreement between ﬁrms i and k. This is the main diﬀerence between the
present approach and the previous literature, in which the transmission of a ﬁrm’s private
signals has a universal nature, as it is immediately and non exclusively received by all other
ﬁrms.
Bilateral sharing agreements generate an information structure that can be usefully de 
scribed as a non directed network. Given a set N, a non directed network g is deﬁned as any
subset of the set of all (unordered) pairs of elements in N:
g ⊆ {ij : i ∈ N and j ∈ N,i  = j}.
5The elements of N are called nodes, and a pair ij ∈ g is called a ”link”. We denote by
N
g
i = {j ∈ N : ij ∈ g}∪{i} the neighbourhood of i in g, with cardinality n
g
i (this cardinality
is called ”degree” of i). We will denote by g − ij the network obtained from g by deleting
the link ij ∈ g and by g + ij the network obtained from g by adding the link ij / ∈ g.
The network g is connected if for all pairs i and j in N there exists a connecting path
P(i,j), that is, a set {i1,i2,...,ik} such that i = i1, j = ik, and ipip+1 ∈ g for all p = 1,...,k−1.
Given the network g, the network h with set of nodes M ⊆ N is a subnetwork of g if h ⊆ g.
The subnetwork h of g is a component of g if it is connected and if for all i ∈ M and j / ∈ M
we have ij / ∈ g. A component h is regular if all i ∈ h have the same degree. With some abuse
of terminology, we will say that the network g is regular when all its components are regular.
The size of a component h, denoted by n(h), is the cardinality of the set M. A component
is completely connected is it is regular and its size coincides with its degree.
We derive the incentives of ﬁrms to form and sever links by associating with each possible
network g the expected proﬁts of each ﬁrm i, denoted by E [πi(g)]. These expectations are
taken ex ante, as decisions to sign sharing agreements are made before the realization of
private signals.2 In more detail, once private signals are realized, ﬁrms play the Cournot
game with incomplete information Γg, in which the information available to ﬁrm i is given by
the vector a
g
i = {aj : j ∈ N
g
i }. We will denote by E [ |a
g
i ] the expectation conditional on the
information a
g
i, and by E
g
i [ ] the expectation taken over all possible realization of the signals
a
g
i. Finally, we denote by qi(g) the quantity set by ﬁrm i in the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
of the game Γg. We have the following standard result (see proposition 1 in Kirby (1988)).
Lemma 1 Ex-ante expected proﬁts of ﬁrm i in the game Γg are given by:





Following Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), we use the concept of pairwise stable networks
as a solution concept for the network formation stage. The network g is pairwise stable if no
link is either formed or severed.
Deﬁnition 1 The network g is pairwise stable iﬀ:
2In this we follow most of the existing literature. A study of link formation at the interim stage is of
great interest, and involves strategic consideration and technical diﬃculties that are not present in the ex-ante
approach. This is left for future research.
6i) E [πi(g)] − E [πi(g − ij)] ≥ 0 and E [πj(g)] − E [πj(g − ij)] ≥ 0 for all ij ∈ g;
ii) if E [πi(g + ij)] − E [πi(g)] > 0 then E [πi(g + ij)] − E [πj(g)] < 0, for all ij / ∈ g.
2.3 Bayesian Cournot Equilibrium for a Given Network of Agreements
Before turning to the analysis of pairwise stable networks in the next sections, we study the
structure of Bayesian Nash Equilibrium of the game Γg in more detail. A pure strategy for




+ → R+ setting a quantity level for each possible vector of signal
observed by i. A Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this game is a proﬁle of strategies (si)i=1,...,n

























































The ﬁrst order conditions (one for each i ∈ N) that characterize a Bayesian Nash equilibrium







































Applying standard results on linear Cournot games with incomplete information (see
Radner (1962)), we can work with equilibrium strategies that are aﬃne in signals. Let αi
be the constant term of the equilibrium strategy of ﬁrm i, and βij be the coeﬃcient applied
by ﬁrm i to each element aj of the vector a
g
i. To identify the equilibrium parameters, we














































We can explicitly derive the expectation of ﬁrm i over ﬁrm j’s signal (for j / ∈ N
g
i ) by
applying standard Bayesian updating formulae:
Ei [aj |a
g














ij is the (1 × n
g
i) vector of covariances between the signals in a
g





i) matrix of variances covariances of the signals in a
g
i and λi
hj(g) is the updating
coeﬃcient applied by agent i to signal ah to infer signal aj in network g (we discuss the
expression of λ coeﬃcients in some detail in section 4).
Using (3) and (5) we obtain an expression of qi in terms only of the signals observed by



























































































We ﬁrst note that the α parameters are deﬁned by an independent set of equations, and
that they do not depend on the network g. Since the expected values of all signal is zero,
this implies that the expected aggregate quantity is the same in each network.
We then observe that the expression for the terms β has intuitive interpretations that
highlight the role of the network in shaping equilibrium behaviour. The term βij (measuring
the reaction of ﬁrm i to the observed signal aj) is determined by the use that ﬁrm i makes






jk(g)), minus the two terms in
the squared brackets. The ﬁrst measures the use that ﬁrm i makes of signal aj in order to
estimate the reaction of the other ﬁrms to signals that i does not observe. If signals are
positively correlated, the larger the terms λi
jk(g) (more correlated signals), the less ﬁrm i
should react to signal aj. This is due to the facts that aj predicts the behaviour of the other
ﬁrms and that strategies are substitutes. The second term has a diﬀerent, though related,
interpretation. Firm i reacts less to signal aj the more numerous are the ﬁrms that observe
8aj and base their decisions on it. Intuitively, the information provided by signal aj is more
valuable the less it is observed by other ﬁrms   a clear congestion eﬀect.
3 Pairwise Stable Networks with Independently Distributed
Signals
If signals are independently distributed, the matrix   has all zeros outside the main diagonal.



















From (8) we note that for each j, the equilibrium coeﬃcients applied to signal aj by the
ﬁrms in N
g
j are determined by an independent set of identical equations, so that βij = βhj
for all i and h in N
g
j . Also, from (9) we note that the coeﬃcients αi are constant with respect
to the network g, and that αi = αh for all i and h.
3.1 Identically Distributed Signals
This section presents the benchmark model of i.i.d. signals, for which all terms on the main
diagonal of matrix   are equal, that is σii = σjj = σ for all i,j ∈ N.. For this case we
are able to fully characterize the set of pairwise stable networks by exploiting the extremely
simple structure of incentives. We start by expressing necessary and suﬃcient conditions for
a network to be pairwise stable.
Proposition 1 A network g is pairwise stable if and only both of the following conditions
are veriﬁed.



















































The proof this and all other results of the paper can be found in the appendix.
Condition (10) requires that no link in a stable network is severed: on the LHS is the
gain in terms of i’s equilibrium quantity’s variance due to the maintenance of link ij, which
has to be greater then the cost of maintaining the link. Condition (11) requires the same for
j. Conditions (12 13) requires that no link is added to a stable network. If the net gain for
ﬁrm i of forming the link ij exceeds the cost c, then the reverse must hold for ﬁrm j.
The incentives to form or sever a link ij only depend on the degree of the nodes i and j
in the network. This is a direct implication of the separability in signals of the equilibrium
coeﬃcients β: the formation or severance of the link ij does not aﬀect the way in which
ﬁrms react to all signals other than ai and aj. The β coeﬃcients determine the variability of
equilibrium strategies and, as shown in the proof of proposition 1, the level of expected proﬁts
(note here that by the assumption of independent signals, the total variance of equilibrium
quantities is separable across signals). So, although total expected proﬁts will typically vary
in diﬀerent networks, the diﬀerence in expected proﬁts induced by the formation of the link









Note that the eﬀect of degrees on incentives described in proposition 1 are similar to those
at work in the coauthor model studied by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). As in that model,
here the incentives of a ﬁrm i to link with another ﬁrm j decrease with the j’s degree and
increase with i’s degree.
We are therefore able to identify thresholds in the degree of a node j, below which a node
i of a given degree would be willing to form (or not to sever) the link ij.
Deﬁnition 2 For any n
g
i, the threshold F(n
g
i) has the property that ﬁrm i does not sever a





Deﬁnition 3 For any n
g
i, the threshold f(n
g
i) has the property that ﬁrm i wishes to form a














2 (2 + n)2
2n + 3
− 2. (15)
We start the analysis of stable pairwise networks by recording properties of the threshold
functions F and f, that will be exploited in the propositions to follow.
Lemma 2 i) F(n) > F(m) if n > m.
ii) f(n) > f(m) if n > m;
iii) F(n) − 1 = f(n − 1).
iv) F(n) − F(n − 1) > 1.
v) n ≤ f(n) if and only if n ≥ 2 and n ≤ F(n) if and only if n ≥ 3.
vi) F(n) < f(n) for all n ≥ 2.
Properties i) and ii) establish monotonicity of F and f: the larger the degree of a node
i, the larger the maximal degree of the nodes that i is willing to stay linked to and to form
a new link with. Property iii) simply says that if a node with degree n is not severing a link
with a node with degree m, then a node with degree n − 1 is willing to form a link with a
node of degree m − 1. Property iv) is purely technical. Property v) says that isolated nodes
have no incentives to link; in all other cases, nodes with equal degree have an incentive to
stay linked. Finally, property vi) implies that if a node of degree n is linked with a node of
degree m, then it has an incentive to link with all other nodes of degree m in the network.
The next proposition characterizes the set of pairwise stable networks for the case of i.i.d.
signals.
Proposition 2 Let n ≥ 3. The set of pairwise stable networks is characterized by the fol-
lowing properties.
i) Every pairwise consists of p ≥ 1 completely connected components, with size either 1
(isolated nodes) or at least 3.
ii) Both p = 1 (complete) and p = n (empty) are always equilibrium architectures.
iii) All components with size of at least 3 are strictly ordered according to size. In par-
ticular, for all S ⊂ N, all architectures in which all nodes in S appear has singleton and
11in which the set of nodes in N\S is organized in p completely connected components of size
n1,n2,...,np such that ni > f(ni+1) for all i = 1,...,p − 1, are stable architectures.
The set of pairwise stable networks characterized in Proposition 2 is very large. However,
we obtain two precise qualitative predictions on stable networks. First, information sharing
is organized in groups (the fully connected components), within which the transmission of
information is equivalent to one in ﬁrms publicly discloses its observed signal to all other
ﬁrms in the group. Second, information sharing groups must be of diﬀerent size, to make
sure that ﬁrms in diﬀerent groups do not form links (remember that by point (v) in lemma 2,
ﬁrms with similar degree link together). For convenience, we will refer to such fully connected
components as ”Information Sharing Groups” (ISG), and to the architectures made only of
such components as ISG networks.
Figure 1. A Pairwise Stable ISG Network
We remark that the empty network is always a stable architecture, conﬁrming the tra 
ditional results of absence of information sharing in Cournot Oligopoly with demand un 
certainty. The stability of other regular structures is a result of the incentives to share
information of non isolated ﬁrms with equal degree. Here we see the eﬀect of the bilateral
structure of contracts, and the implication of adopting a link based concept of stability: the
incentives of two oligopolists to share information crucially depend on their location in the
network.
123.2 Signals with Heterogeneous Variances
In this section we relax the assumption that signals are identically distributed, and allow
the variances of ﬁrms’ signals   the terms on the main diagonal of     to diﬀer. In this
new context we are able to address new and interesting issues, relating the architecture of
stable networks, and the position of various ﬁrms in such architectures, to the distribution
of variances.
For simplicity we focus on the case of no linking costs. Steps at all similar to those
employed in the proof of proposition 1 lead to the following necessary and suﬃcient conditions
for a network g to be pairwise stable:























































j, the incentive of i to sever
the link ij increases with the ratio of variances
σii
σjj
. Conversely, the incentive of i to form the
link ij decreases with
σii
σjj
. This can be understood in terms of the additional variability of
i’s equilibrium quantity due to the link ij. The higher the term σjj, the higher the additional
variability of i’s quantity due to ij, and the higher the informational ”value” of j’s signal for
ﬁrm i. Similarly, the higher the term σii, the lower the incentive of ﬁrm i to form the link ij;
this because it is costly to share a signal with high variance with one additional ﬁrm. Again,
a high value of σii reﬂects therefore a high informational value of i’s signal. The eﬀect of
ﬁrms’ degrees on the incentive to form a link are therefore enriched by the eﬀect of signals’
variances, so that a ﬁrm with low degree may now ﬁnd it proﬁtable to form a link with a
ﬁrm with high degree if the latter has a relatively high variance.
We start by looking at two architectures, the empty and the complete, that were shown
to be always stable in the case of i.i.d. signals without costs: the empty and the complete
13networks. We ﬁrst show that the empty network is still a pairwise stable architecture, and
that this results holds true even if the ﬁrm with lower variance were allowed to make ex ante
transfers to convince a potential partner to sign a sharing agreement.
Proposition 3 The empty network is pairwise stable for all distributions of variances. More-
over, the empty network remains pairwise stable even if ﬁrms are allowed to make side pay-
ments at the ex-ante stage..
Diﬀerently from the symmetric case, the complete network fails to be stable when vari 
ances diﬀer substantially. This comes as a result of the weak incentives of ﬁrms with high
variance to link with ﬁrms with low variance (see conditions (16) (17) and the subsequent
discussion).
Example 1 Consider the complete network g with three nodes. Node 1 has variance σ1 = 1,
while node 2 has variance σ2 = 7
10. Condition (16) is not satisﬁed for node 1 who severs link
12.
In the example, link 12 is severed due to the large diﬀerence in the variances of ﬁrm 1’s








Although this condition is violated in example 1, we note that the RHS of (20) grows
without bound with n, implying that (20) would be satisﬁed for n large enough. This implies
the following proposition.
Proposition 4 For any distribution of the variances, there exists a ﬁnite number of ﬁrms   n
such that for all n ≥   n the complete network is pairwise stable.
We now turn to the eﬀect of heterogeneity on the set of pairwise stable ISG networks
other than the empty and complete ones. We ﬁrst note that components with equal size
may, in principle, be consistent with stability. In such structures, stability would require
ﬁrms in diﬀerent components to have diﬀerent variances, in order not to face incentives to
”bridge” components. This intuitive argument is made clear in the next proposition. Let
(σ11,σ22,...,σnn) be the variances of the n ﬁrms, with the convention that σii < σjj for all
14i = 1,...,n − 1 and j = i + 1. We say that the network g is consecutive if components can
be ordered as (h1,h2,...,hp) with the following property. Let σ−(h) and σ+(h) be the lowest
and highest variances of ﬁrms in component h. Then if i ∈ hk+1 we have σii > σ+(h) for all
k = 1,...,p − 1.
Proposition 5 Let g be a pairwise stable network in which all components are fully connected
and of the same size. Then g is consecutive.
The next is an example of such stable structures.
Example 2 Consider a network with 9 nodes, made of three fully connected components of
size 3, with set of nodes h1 = {12,23,13}, h2 = {45,56,46}, h3 = {78,89,79}. Variances are
constant within components: σ1 = σ2 = σ3 = 1; σ4 = σ5 = σ6 = 1
2; σ7 = σ8 = σ9 = 1
4. For
any link across components not to form we need the ﬁrm with larger variance y not to wish













The ratio x = 1
2y in the example satisﬁes this constraint for all components.
We ﬁnally turn to the analysis of pairwise stable networks which are not ISG networks.
As for the case of i.i.d signals, we ﬁnd that regular incomplete architecture are never pairwise
stable.
Proposition 6 There exists no distribution of variances under which a pairwise stable net-
work can include regular and incomplete components.
The result of Proposition 6 can be understood as follows. From the stability conditions
derived in section 3.1, two ﬁrms with same degree and variance always have an incentive
to form a link. We have also noted that if two ﬁrms have the same degree, then the ﬁrm
with a higher variance has less incentive to form the link (see condition (18)). Proposition 6
shows that although we may eliminate the incentives of any two ﬁrms in a regular network to
form a link by choosing the appropriate distribution of variances, by doing so we necessarily
introduce incentives to sever links from the network. As a result, no incomplete and regular
architecture is pairwise stable.
15Diﬀerently from the i.i.d. case, when ﬁrms have heterogeneous variance non regular
architectures may be stable. Intuitively, this is due to the fact that ﬁrms with large variance
and large degree need not have an incentive to sever a link, and, at the same time, can still be
”attractive” for ﬁrms with lower variance and degree, acting therefore as ”connectors” in the
network. We show that such architectures, usually referred to as ”core periphery networks”
can be pairwise stable for suitable distributions of variances. In more detail, core periphery
networks present a dense set of interconnected nodes   the core   each linked with all nodes
in the network, and sets of peripheral nodes which are internally connected and are linked
with the core nodes (see ﬁgure 2). Formally, a core periphery network g consists of a set
{g1,g2,....gH} of fully connected subnetworks, such that i ∈ gk and j ∈ gm implies that ij / ∈ g
for all k  = m such that k = 2,3,...,H and m = 2,3,...,H, and such that i ∈ g1 and j ∈ gk
implies ij ∈ g for all k = 1,2,3,...,H. We call the subnetwork g1 core, and the subnetworks
{g2,....gH} peripheral planets. A symmetric core periphery network is such that all peripheral
planets contain the same number of nodes np ≥ 1, and in which all nodes in the same planet





Proposition 7 A symmetric core-periphery network is pairwise stable for some distribution
of variances only if the following condition holds:
 
(nc + np + 1)
2
2nc + 2np + 3
 H−1
≤
n2 (nc + np)
2
(2n + 1)(2nc + 2np + 1)
. (21)
A direct consequence of condition (21) is that the ”star” network (in which np = nc = 1)
is never pairwise stable. The next is an example of a stable core periphery architecture.
Example 3 Consider a network with 5 nodes: node 1 is the ”core” node, while the two
peripheral components are {23} and {45}. Variances are σ1 = 1, σ2 = σ3 = 1
5, σ4 = σ5 = 1
2.











































Figure 2. A core periphery network
3.3 The Eﬀect of a Linking Cost
Before turning to the more complex and richer case of correlated signals in section 4, we brieﬂy
study the eﬀect of an exogenous cost of forming links on the architecture of stable networks.
The cost c represents all monetary expenditures that a ﬁrm bears in order to arrange and
execute an information sharing agreement. For instance, when such arrangements are viewed
by the regulator as a signal of collusion, the cost c may refer to the expected ﬁne. For
simplicity, and in order to isolate the pure eﬀect of costs, we return here to the benchmark
model of i.i.d. signals.
Interestingly, the addition of a linking cost has qualitative eﬀects on the condition for
pairwise stability, with a new role played by market conditions (the slope b of the demand
function) and by the magnitude of the variance σ. The following stability conditions are
obtained by a minor modiﬁcation of the proof of proposition 1:































































Notice the role played by the parameter b: a more elastic demand (small b) provides
higher incentives to maintain (and to form) links, while a rigid demand (large b) provides




, and refer to the single elements of C only when needed.
In the next proposition we study the eﬀect of the new stability conditions on the set of
pairwise stable networks. In order to compare the stable networks given a cost c with those
characterized in proposition 2 in the absence of costs, we restrict the analysis to the set of
regular networks,
Proposition 8 Let c > 0. There exist size levels m1(C) ≤ 4 ≤ m2(C) such that all regular
pairwise stable networks satisfy the following properties:
a) no component of size 2 ≤ n(h) < m1(C) exists.
b) all components h of size m1(C) ≤ n(h) ≤ m2(C) are fully connected;
c) all components h of size n(h) ≥ m2(C) have degree equal to m2(C);
We can better understand the eﬀect of a linking cost c on equilibrium architectures by
ﬁrst looking at stable ISG networks. Point b) imposes a lower bound and an upper bound on
the size of a stable ISG (that is, of a stable fully connected component). These bounds can
be understood as follows. The presence of a linking cost c increases the incentives to sever
links. This disrupts the stability of those components whose members have lower incentives
to maintain their links (as these are expressed by the LHS of conditions (22) (22)). As
explained in the proof of Proposition 8, these incentives are non monotonic in the size m of a
component, increasing until m = 4 and decrease thereafter. It follows that as the gross cost
parameter C increases, the largest and smallest ISGs are the ﬁrst to drop out of the set of
stable ISG. Interestingly, market conditions play a role for the size of ISGs. In particular,
to more elastic demand curves correspond lower values of C, allowing for the emergence of
large ISGs.
18The second eﬀect of the cost c is to decrease the incentives to form new links. This allows
ISGs with similar size in a stable network, since links bridging components are harder to
form.
Point b) of Proposition 8 considers the possibility that a pairwise stable network include
non complete components. While the emergence of such structures is a natural consequence
of a positive (large enough) cost c, proposition 8 provides information on the relation between
the density of a component (measured here as the ration between average degree and size)
and its size. In a stable conﬁguration, larger groups partially share information (organizing
in a non complete component), while smaller groups (with size smaller than m2(C)) share
information more intensely (see ﬁgure 3).
Figure 3. The relation between size and degree of stable components
4 Stable Networks with Correlated Signals
We ﬁnally turn to the case of correlated signal. For simplicity, we assume that signals are
identically distributed. In this case the matrix   has a constant term σ on the main diagonal,
and a constant term ρ ∈ [0,σ] elsewhere. The expression of the updating coeﬃcients λ
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is a correlation coeﬃcient. We can now rewrite (6) (7) as:
βij =



































Direct computations using (25) (26) show that each ﬁrm prefers the empty network to
the complete network for all possible values of the correlation parameter δ. This is just a
special case of proposition 4.4 in Raith (1996). However, the next proposition shows that
empty network is not pairwise stable if correlation is larger that a given threshold.
Proposition 9 Let n ￿ 4 and δ ∈ [0,1]. There exists a threshold δ(n) such that for all δ ￿
δ(n) the empty network is not pairwise stable.
The intuition behind Proposition 9 is very simple. Compared to the case of independent
signals (in which the empty network is always stable), correlation brings in new incentives to
form a link starting from the empty network. Such incentives come from the better inference
that linking ﬁrms expect to make on the signals and the behaviour of other ﬁrms. This
better inference comes at no additional cost in terms of revealing one’s own signal, and is
not present when signals are independent. In order for such new incentives to undermine the
stability of the empty network, both the number of ﬁrms and the correlation parameter must
be large enough. This is intuitive, since they both measure how eﬀective the new inference
is, in terms of precision and in terms of number of signals to be inferred. This result makes
clear how bilateral sharing agreement may be proﬁtable even in a Cournot oligopoly with
homogeneous goods   a conclusion in contrast with the traditional view, well summarized
by proposition 4.4 in Raith (1996). The diﬀerence in results is mainly due to the diﬀerence
in the transmission mechanism and in the adopted equilibrium concept. Bilateral contracts
allow two ﬁrms to reach a sharing agreement without necessarily share their signal with
all ﬁrms in the market. The pairwise stability concept allow two ﬁrms to coordinate their
action, possibility that was missing in the early analysis of quid pro quo contracts by Kirby
(1988), who looks at the Nash Equilibria of the sharing game, who suﬀer, in the presence of
correlation, of coordination failures.
20The next proposition shows that the instability of the empty network does not come from
a general existence problem.
Proposition 10 The complete network is stable for all δ ∈ [0,1]
Characterizing all pairwise stable networks for this case of correlation is a very hard task.
It is actually very diﬃcult to simply understand the eﬀect of correlation of the equilibrium
coeﬃcients (and thus on the incentives to form links) in a generic network g, as these are
expressed in conditions (25) (26). In order to get some understanding on the eﬀect of cor 
relation, we fully work out the case of four ﬁrms, the minimal number that allows for non
trivial equilibrium structures.
4.1 Pairwise Stable Network with 4 Firms
With four ﬁrms, there are eleven architectures to be considered.
g1 g2 g3 g4
g5 g6 g7 g8
g9 g10 g11
Figure 4. Possible architectures with 4 ﬁrms
We identify pairwise stable architectures for various ranges of the correlation parameter
δ.
1. When δ is low (δ ≤ 0.619), the set of stable networks has the same qualitative features
as in the case of independent signals: empty and complete networks are stable, plus an
ISG network, in particular network ”g6” in ﬁgure ??.
212. For an intermediate range of δ (0.619 ≤ δ ≤ 0.710), network ”g6” ceases to be stable.
In this range, a link between a ﬁrm i in the completely connected component and the
isolated ﬁrm j is formed. It is interesting to note that ﬁrm i wishes to form the link
for δ ≤ 0.710, while ﬁrm j wishes to form it for 0.619 ≥ δ. This highlights the eﬀect of
correlation: if correlation is low, then ﬁrm i has not a good enough inference on ﬁrm
j’s signal, and wishes to form the link ij; if correlation is high, ﬁrm j wishes to form
the link, in order to have a good inference on the remaining ﬁrms. Note that ﬁrm j has
a low degree, and would never accept to form the link ij in the absence of correlation.
3. As δ grows (0.710 ≤ δ ≤ 0.747), network ”g6” becomes stable again, since ﬁrm i has a
good enough inference on ﬁrm j due to i’s high degree and the high level of correlation.
4. Finally, if δ grows even more, the empty network ceases to be a stable architecture, as
was proved for the general case in proposition 9.
Interestingly, the stability of the network ”g6” in the ranges of values δ ≤ 0.619 and
0.710 ≤ δ results from diﬀerent incentives of ﬁrms. When δ is low, each of the three ﬁrms
sharing information would like to link to the isolated ﬁrm, whose signal has a large infor 
mational value due to the low degree. In this case, the isolated ﬁrm decides not to join the
group. When δ is high, the three ﬁrms sharing information are excluding the fourth ﬁrm,







Figure 5. Pairwise stable networks for various ranges of δ
225 Conclusions
We have studied the incentives of oligopolistic ﬁrms to share information on a random demand
intercept by means of bilateral contracts. We have ﬁrst studied the benchmark model of i.i.d.
signals, for which we have shown that pairwise stable networks are made of fully connected
components of increasing size. When linking has a cost, then non complete components can
be stable, and in this case density is inversely related to size. We have then shown that
when variances of signals are heterogeneous, non regular components of the core periphery
architecture may arise in equilibrium, with high variance ﬁrms acting as connectors. Finally,
correlated signals introduce new and interesting aspects of analysis, and group formation and
exclusion seem to be typical features of this case.
Although we believe that the novelty of our approach brings new and interesting insights
in the theory of information sharing, there are several aspects of the present analysis that
deserve discussion and improvement. First, the notion of pairwise stability is somewhat
speciﬁc, and one may wish to study solution concepts that allow multiple links to be formed
or severed at the same time. Also, the assumption that information sharing occurs at the
ex ante stage could be removed, so to explore the rich strategic structure of an interim model
of information sharing. Finally, the assumption that all ﬁrms reveal truthfully their signal is
quite strong (although common to all this stream of literature), and the incentives to report
false information could be dealt with in an interim model. Finally, a full characterization
of stable network in the case of correlated signals is certainly desirable, although technically
quite diﬃcult. We leave all of these issues for future research.
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246 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. To explicitly derive the term E [πi(g)], consider the best response

































































where P(a,g) is the market price given realization a in network g. Given a and g, ﬁrm i´s
equilibrium proﬁts can be expressed as:
πi(a,g) =





The (interim) expected value of πi(a,g) evaluated by ﬁrm i in g is:
Ei
 
















Ex ante expected proﬁts E [πi(g)] of ﬁrm i in g are now obtained as follows:







Proof of proposition 1.
From (31), ex ante proﬁts are given by Ei
 
bqii(g)2 
. Using standard results, we write for


















2 + E [x]
2 − 2xE [x]
￿￿
=
2E [xE [x]] − E [x]
2 = E [x]
2 .
25We can therefore write:












Since from (30) Ei [qi(g)] = A
b(n+1) irrespective of the graph structure, we conclude that the
diﬀerence between the proﬁts of ﬁrm i in graphs g and g′ = g−ij (for ij ∈ g) is the diﬀerence
in the two variances of equilibrium quantities:









We can write down explicit expressions for the equilibrium parameters as follows:To obtain
an expression for this diﬀerence, let us explicitly derive the equilibrium coeﬃcients βij and








 , ∀i ∈ N
g




∀i ∈ N. (35)
It is clear from (35) that the coeﬃcient applied to signal j only depends on the degree
of node j, and is independent of all other topological properties of the network. Also, the
ex ante expected equilibrium quantity in the aggregate game Γg is αi. Using (35) 35), the

















































k + 1)2b2. (39)
The only two terms that are diﬀerent in the sums of the above expressions of variances are




i − 1 we obtain that:








































j)2 ≥ 0. (41)
We now turn to the condition for the link ij / ∈ g not to be formed. Firm i has an incentive
to form ij inducing the network g′ = g + ij if
var(qi(g′)) − var(qi(g)) > 0 (42)
where qi and q′
i are the equilibrium quantities in g and g′, respectively. Stability requires
that if (42) holds then:
var(qj(g′)) − var(qj(g)) < 0. (43)




































27Proof of Lemma 2: Point i) is implied by the fact that the RHS of (14) is increasing
in n: it is always positive for all n. Point ii) is proved along the same lines of point i). To




(1 + n)2 =
1
(1 + F(n))2. (46)
1
(1 + m)2 −
1
(2 + m)2 =
1
(2 + f(m))2. (47)
The LHS of (46) and of (47) coincide for all m−1. It follows that also the RHS must coincide





(1 + n)2 − n2 − 1.
For n = 2 we obtain:









We then compute the derivative d
dn [F(n) − F(n − 1)], that it is positive for all value n > 2.
v) Simple algebraic manipulation of conditions (14) (15).
vi) Directly from iii) and iv).￿
Proof of Proposition 2. i) We ﬁrst show that only regular networks can be pairwise
stable. Let g be pairwise stable, and let h be a non regular component of g. Then there exist
nodes i and j such that ni > nj and ij ∈ h. This means that there exists some node k  = j
such that ik ∈ h and jk / ∈ h. Pairwise stability of g imposes the following requirements on
the degrees of nodes i, j and k:
nk ≤ F(ni) and ni ≤ F(nk);
nj ≤ F(ni) and ni ≤ F(nj). (48)
Note now that since ni > nj, then ni − 1 ≥ nj (remember that degrees are integers).
This, together with (48), implies
nj ≤ F(nk) − 1. (49)
28Point iii) in lemma 2 together with (49) imply:
nj ≤ f(nk − 1). (50)
We ﬁnally use point (ii) in lemma 2 to conclude that:
nj < f(nk). (51)
For g to be stable, link jk should not form. This, together with (51), requires that:
nk > f(nj). (52)
Suppose now that nk ≤ nj. In this case, condition (48) plus point (iv) in lemma 2 would
imply that ni ≤ f(nj), implying, together with (51), that nj > ni, a contradiction. We have
therefore concluded that nk > ni.
This result implies that there exists some node w such that wk ∈ h, wi / ∈ h and nw > nk.
To these three nodes i, k and w we can now apply similar arguments as above to conclude
that there exists some neighbour w′ of w such that w′k / ∈ h and nw′ > nw. Reiterating these
steps, and given that the number of nodes n is ﬁnite, we obtain a contradiction.
Consider now a regular component of degree m. Since m ≤ f(m) for all m, we conclude
that each component of g is fully connected. Components of size 2 are not stable because
F(2) < 2 by point v) of lemma (2).
ii) The complete network and the empty network are both stable since F(m) ≥ m for
m ≥ 3 and f(1) < 1 by point v) of lemma 2. This last inequality also implies that isolated
ﬁrms do not wish to form a link with ﬁrms in a component of size m ≥ 2. .
iii) Two components of the same size m ≥ 2 are not consistent with stability, since
f(m) ≥ m by point v) of lemma 2. To complete the proof of point iii), note that any pair of
components of sizes m1 < m2 such that m1 ≥ 3, m2 ≥ 3 and m2 > f(m1) are such that no
link is severed within components nor formed across components.￿
Proof of Proposition 3:. The change in aggregate proﬁts of isolated ﬁrms i and j when














which is always negative for all values of σjj.and σii￿
Proof of Proposition 5: Consider components hk and hk+1, both of the same size q.
Let j be the ﬁrm with highest variance in hk (σ+(hk) = σjj) and let l be the ﬁrm with lowest
29variance in hk (σ−(hk) = σll). Stability conditions for component h require that ﬁrm j does






Suppose now that there exists ﬁrm i ∈ hk+1 such that σii < σ+(hk). In order for the network







Conditions (53) (54) imply:
(m + 1)







If σii ≥ σll we have that
(m + 1)
2 (m + 1)
2
(m + 2)
2 m2 ≤ 1
which is never satisﬁed. Suppose now that σii < σll and that there exists some ﬁrm m such
that σii > σll (if such ﬁrm does not exist the consecutiveness of g is not violated). In this
case, the same steps used above can be followed by replacing ﬁrm j with ﬁrm m and ﬁrm l
with ﬁrm j.￿
Proof of Proposition 6: We proceed as follows. We ﬁrst show in step 1 that if g contains
a minimal cycle of length at least 4, then g cannot be pairwise stable for any conﬁguration
of variances. We then show that if g is regular and incomplete with degree at least 3, then g
contains a minimal cycle of length at least 4.
Step 1.. Let g  = gc be a connected regular network of degree k, with k ≥ 2. Let
P = {1,2,....x,1} be a minimal cycle of length x ≥ 4. For simplicity, in this proof we denote

























It can be easily checked that (57) and (56) are not compatible.
Step 2. Let g be a regular incomplete connected network of degree k, with k ≥ 3.
Consider three nodes i, j, and l such that ij / ∈ g, il ∈ g and jl ∈ g (such three nodes must




j = k, there must exist j1  = l such
that j1  = i, j1 ∈ N
g
j and j1 / ∈ N
g
l . If j1 ∈ N
g
i , then we obtain the 4 minimal cycle {i,l,j,j1,i}
(see ﬁgure 6). If, instead, j1 / ∈ N
g
i , consider the set N
g
j1. Again, since j1 / ∈ N
g







j = k, there must exist a node j2 ∈ N
g
j1 such that j2 / ∈ N
g
j (and, therefore,
j2  = l). If j2 ∈ N
g
l , then we obtain the 4 minimal cycle {l,j,j1,j2,l}. If j2 / ∈ N
g
l but j2 ∈ N
g
i ,
then we obtain the 5 minimal cycle {i,l,j,j1,j2,i}. If, instead, j2 / ∈ N
g
l and j2 / ∈ N
g
i , then
consider the set N
g
j2. Since j2 / ∈ N
g
j and j1 ∈ N
g
j , and since in a k regular network each node
has the same degree k, there must exist a node j3 ∈ N
g
j2 such that j3 / ∈ N
g
j1 (and, therefore,
j3  = j). Note also that j3  = l, j3  = i by the previous arguments. It follows that if j3 ∈ N
g
i
we obtain a 6 minimal cycle; a 5 minimal cycle is obtained if j3 ∈ N
g
l ; a 4 minimal cycle
is obtained if j3 ∈ N
g
j . If none of these is true, then we consider N
g










In general, for any jm obtained along this process, there must exist a node jm+1 ∈ N
g
jm such
that jm+1 / ∈ N
g
jm−1. So, if jm+1 ∈ N
g





jm−3, we have a 5 minimal cyle, and so on until we check whether jm+1 ∈ N
g
i . If
none of these inclusions is veriﬁed, we can identify a node jm+2 ∈ N
g
jm+1 such that jm+2 / ∈ N
g
jm
and such that jm+2  = jm−i for all i = 0,1,2,...,m − 1. Since the number of nodes is ﬁnite,
the process must stop and a minimal cycle of size at least 4 must be found.￿
Proof of Proposition 7. Denote by i ∈ g1 and j ∈ ∪H
k=2gk. From proposition 1, we





(n + 1)2 ≤
σjj
(nc + np + 1)2 (59)
σjj
(nc + np)2 −
σjj
(nc + np + 1)2 ≤
σii
(1 + n)2. (60)
These conditions can be rewritten as follows:
σjj ≥ σii
(2n + 1)(nc + np + 1)2
(1 + n)2n2 (61)
σjj ≥ σii
(nc + np)2(nc + np + 1)2
(2nc + 2np + 1)(n + 1)
2 (62)
It follows that a link between agents i ∈ g1 and agent j ∈ ∪h




(2n + 1)(nc + np + 1)2
(1 + n)2n2 ,σii
(nc + np)2(nc + np + 1)2




32This condition indirectly imposes an upper bound rmax on the ratio between the larger and
the smaller variance of agents in the set ∪h
k=2gk:
rmax =
n2 (nc + np)
2
(2n + 1)(2nc + 2np + 1)
. (64)
We now turn to the conditions ensuring that no link between agents i ∈ gk and j ∈ gm
is formed. Note ﬁrst that since all peripheral components have the same degree, a necessary
condition for ij not to form is that σii  = σjj. Moreover, from proposition 1 we know that,
given that i and j have the same degree, the node with smaller variance has an incentive to
form the link; we then need to require that the node with larger variance has no incentive to
do so. Without loss of generality, suppose σ2
i > σ2
j. The link ij does not form if:
σii
(nc + np + 1)
2 −
σii
(nc + np + 2)
2 >
σjj




(nc + np + 1)
2
2nc + 2np + 3
σj. (66)




(nc + np + 1)
2
2nc + 2np + 3
. (67)
Under this condition, the minimum ratio between the larger and the smaller possible vari 






, where H is the number of peripheral
planets. Then, a necessary and suﬃcient condition for the network g to be pairwise stable is
that rmin ≤ rmax, that is condition (21).￿
Proof of Proposition 8. We ﬁrst prove that for each C there exist integers m1(C) ≤ 4
and m2(C) ≥ 4 such that two ﬁrms with equal degree m have an incentives to maintain their
link if and only if m1(C) ≤ m ≤ m2(C). Also, for all m in this range, two ﬁrms with degree
m − 1 have an incentive to form a link. To see this, note that the stability condition ?? can










33The LHS of expression (68), when deﬁned on the set of integers, reaches a maximum at
m = 4, and is increasing for m ≤ 3 and decreasing for m ≥ 4. The values m1(C) and m2(C)
are the ﬁrst integers above and below the smaller and larger solutions of (68) taken with
equality, respectively.
a) Suppose component h is such that m1(C) ≤ n(h) ≤ m2(C) and is not completely
connected. Then, its degree m is strictly less than m2(C). If m < m1(C) then by lemma ??
there exist a ﬁrm with an incentive to sever one of its links. If m ≥ m1(C), then by lemma
?? we conclude that there exist two ﬁrms with an incentive to form a link. This because
m + 1 ≤ m2(C).
b) Suppose that n(h) ≥ m2(C) and the degree of h is strictly smaller than m2(C). Lemma
?? implies again that there exist two ﬁrms with an incentive to form a link. Suppose the
degree of h is strictly larger than m2(C). In this case lemma ?? implies that there are
incentives to sever a link.￿
Proof of Proposition 9. Consider the empty network. Applying (25) and (26) we obtain
α = A
b(n+1) and βii =
1+δ(n−1)
b[2+δ(n−1)] where qi = α + βiiai ∀i. The payoﬀ is πi = β2σ for all i.
Now consider two ﬁrms, i and j, forming a link. Applying (25) and (26) we obtain α = A
b(n+1)




j = α + βii (ai + aj).
Expected proﬁts of ﬁrms i and j are π′
i = π′
j = 2   β2
ii (σ + ρ). Now we consider a variable
D = πi − π′
i; when D is positive the empty network is stable, otherwise it is not. By direct








2 . The sign
of D is the same as the sign of the numerator in the second term. We ﬁnd that D has only
one root in δ satisfying D = 0 for all n ￿ 4 and D is strictly positive for δ = 0. ￿
Proof of Proposition 10. Consider the complete network. Applying (25) we ob 
tain α = A
b(n+1) and βii = 1
b(n+1) where qi = α + βii
 
j∈N
aj ∀i. The payoﬀ for each ﬁrm
i is πi = β2 [n   σ + n   (n − 1)ρ]. Now consider two ﬁrms, i and j, severing a link. Ap 
plying (25) we obtain α = A
b(n+1) for all i and βii = βjj =
1+δ(n−1)
b[n+δ(n−1)
2], βih = βjh =
n[1+δ(n−1)]
b(n+1)[n+δ(n−1)2]for all h  = i,j, where q′
i = α + βiiai + βih
 
h∈N/{i,j}










2(n − 2)βiiβih + (n − 2)(n − 3)β2
ih
 
ρ. Now we consider a
variable D = πi − π′
i; when D is positive the complete network is stable, otherwise it is not.
By direct computation we get: D = σ
(1−δ)[1+δ(n−1)]{n[n−2+(n−3)(n−1)δ]−1}
b2(n+1)2[n+(n−1)2δ]
2 , which is strictly
positive for all δ ∈ [0,1). ￿
34